Bernard Williams is frequently supposed to be an ethical Humean, due especially to his work on 'internal' reasons. In fact Williams's work after his famous article 'Internal and External Reasons' constitutes a profound shift away from Hume's ethical outlook. Whereas Hume offered a reconciling project whereby our ethical practices could be self-validating without reference to external justificatory foundations, Williams's later work was increasingly skeptical of any such possibility. I conclude by suggesting reasons for thinking Williams was correct, a finding which should be of concern for anybody engaged in the study of ethics.
I
In a recent study Lorenzo Greco has proposed that there exist important affinities between the ethical philosophies of Bernard Williams and David Hume.
1 In addition to the well-known fact that both Williams and Hume are committed to theories of 'internal reasons', Greco proposes a set of further 'Humean reflections' in Williams's ethical Hume next presents what appears to be a most unskeptical conclusion:
[T]he happiest disposition of mind is the virtuous; or, in other words, that which leads to action and employment, renders us sensible to the social passions, steels the heart against the assaults of fortune, reduces the affections to a just moderation, makes our thoughts an entertainment to us, and inclines us rather to the pleasures of society and conversation, than those of the senses (EMPL.168, emphasis in original).
If virtue relates to what is useful and agreeable to self and others, possessing the virtues will in general be closely correlated to happiness for their possessors. But Hume immediately casts further doubt upon the connections between virtue and happiness.
Since happiness depends on our passions, were we able to alter these at will we could guarantee happiness. But 'the fabric and constitution of our mind no more depends on our choice, than that of our body'. Since we cannot alter the internal constitution of our mind, 'Such are effectually excluded from all pretensions to philosophy, and the medicine of the mind, so much boasted'. The power of reflection to alter one's passions is extremely small, 'the empire of philosophy extends over a few; and with regard to these too, her authority is very weak and limited'. Hume draws the skeptical conclusion: though morality was an outgrowth of human passion no debunking consequences followed. The Enquiry restated the explanatory mechanism of the Treatise, but aimed to show that, operating entirely from inside, the operation of human passion alone was quite capable of maintaining the 'reality of moral distinctions', providing the 'obligation'
to virtue, and in turn the meaning and worth of human ethical existence.
Hume's vision, not least in its entirely secular nature, is certainly scaled down from history's more ambitious attempts to invest human ethical existence with meaning.
But nonetheless Hume's 'optimism' differs fundamentally from Williams's later outlook. pertained to a rigid systematisation of ethical life into a narrow form preoccupied with duty and obligation, excluding other areas of human value -the artistic, the non-duty orientated, the tragic, that deeply embedded in luck and contingency -and purported to subsume these beneath the iron rule of morality, denigrating their value as inherently inferior to the all-trumping commands of obligation. 56 The morality system trades on a series of philosophical falsehoods and misconceptions, which in turn generate practices which are unhealthy for ethical agents and which license attitudes and behaviours masking that unhealthiness whilst providing cover for impulses such as cruelty, malice and the infliction of pain. 57 In particular the morality system employs a metaphysically false concept of agency whereby an individual is identified with a shadowy figure   ' behind' choices and actions, who is held responsible for these (despite concomitant metaphysical absurdity), and which serves as a locus for punishment and cruelty, and in turn frequent self-loathing and self-hatred cloaked under the justification of a philosophically suspicious, and perhaps outright incoherent, concept of 'moral responsibility'. 58 In advancing these concerns Williams was in affinity with the critique of morality put forward by Nietzsche -and 63 It might here be queried whether Kant's moral philosophy -supposedly the highest embodiment of the morality system -does in fact supposes such external justificatory grounds. After all, for Kant the reasons we have for adhering to morality are in some sense clearly internal insofar as the autonomous agent's reason legislates them to herself. Although this is true, the point about Kant's moral law is that it applies universally to all rational agents regardless of their particular inclinations or circumstances, and is thus precisely a categorical demand. The agent's will must be brought into line with universal principles, which are themselves fundamental precisely because the same laws apply to all rational beings equally. It is this external universality which gives moral principles their full moral status, and provides the justificatory grounds for moral law, even if such law still has to be self-legislated by the rational agent. 64 
